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How the Supreme Court
Derailed Formal Rulemaking
Kent Barnett*
ABSTRACT
Based on archival research, this Essay explores the untold story of how the
Supreme Court in the 1970s largely ended “formal” trial-like rulemaking by
federal agencies in two railway cases. In the first, nearly forgotten decision,
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., the Court held sua sponte that an
agency was not required to use formal rulemaking, despite its significant
historical provenance. That unpersuasive decision all but decided the second,
better-known decision, United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, the following
term. In response to both decisions, agencies abandoned formal rulemaking—one
of only four broad categories of agency action—and policymakers and scholars
largely ceased debating its virtues. Findings from the Justices’ personal papers—
including that the Court identified the issue only after oral argument and
appeared deeply uninterested in Allegheny-Ludlum—should revive the longmuted debate among scholars and Congress over formal rulemaking’s utility and
the continued vitality of the Court’s railway decisions.

INTRODUCTION
Formal “on the record” rulemaking is as curious to contemporary
minds as it was commonplace to the modern administrative state’s
founders. It refers to federal agencies’ promulgation of regulations under
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)1 based on a closed record from
a trial-like hearing with witnesses, cross-examination, an administrative
law judge (“ALJ”) or other hearing officer, and findings of fact and law.2 It
contrasts with more familiar, informal notice-and-comment rulemaking,
which has neither trial-like procedure, closed record, nor specific findings
of fact or law.3 In two railroad cases decided in the early 1970s, the
Supreme Court allowed formal rulemaking to fall largely into desuetude
with little fanfare.4 Given formal rulemaking’s then-growing reputation for
furthering administrative lethargy and interest-group capture, few lamented
* Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I very much appreciate
helpful comments and materials from Gary Lawson, Ron Levin, Aaron Nielson, and Miriam
Seifter. I am also very grateful to the editors of The George Washington Law Review for
their careful attention to my Essay.
1 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2012)).
2 See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556–57 (2012) (outlining the administrative
rulemaking process).
3 See id. § 553.
4 See infra notes 10, 17 and accompanying text.
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its demise.5
Notwithstanding its often maligned status, formal rulemaking had an
established provenance and significant prominence within early-modern
administrative law.6 This was especially true of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (“ICC”), the agency at issue in both railroad cases.7 Indeed,
the parties in both cases proceeded throughout the administrative
proceedings with the understanding that the ICC was required to use formal
rulemaking, and no one challenged its use in the consolidated litigation that
reached the Supreme Court.8 Why, then, did formal rulemaking meet such
an unceremonious end? Responding to thoughtful speculation,9 this Essay
turns to the Justices’ files to address this question.
The answer lies primarily in the Court’s sua sponte treatment of the
issue in the first and significantly lesser known of the two decisions, United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.10 That case concerned regulations
that governed how shared railway freight cars should be returned to their
owners.11 The Court held that the underlying statute’s requirement that
rules be made only “after hearing” did not trigger formal rulemaking under
the APA because it did not specifically call for the rules’ promulgation “on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.”12 Whatever the policy
merits of formal rulemaking, the Court’s sua sponte rejection of formal
rulemaking was perfunctory, relied upon unpersuasive authorities, and
failed to account for formal rulemaking’s consistent historical
understandings and use.13 Remarkable primary documents from the
5

See Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 240
(2014) (quoting AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW & REGULATORY PRACTICE,
COMMENTS ON H.R. 3010, THE REGULATORY ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2011, at 21 (Oct. 24,
2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/administrative_law/commentso
n3010_final_nocover.authcheckdam.pdf) (reevaluating formal rulemaking’s benefits but
noting that the ABA’s Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice stated it had
“not identified a single scholarly article written in the past thirty years that expresses regret
about the retreat from formal rulemaking”). But cf. David P. Currie, Rulemaking Under the
Illinois Pollution Law, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 457, 471 (1975) (“I found that rulemaking on the
record of hearings in which full cross-examination was permitted worked extremely well for
the [Illinois] Pollution Control Board.”).
6 See Nielson, supra note 3, at 243–47.
7 See id. at 244.
8 See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 220–22 (3d ed. 2004).
9 See
GARY LAWSON, TEACHER’S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 142–44 (3d ed. 2004).
10 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
11 See id. at 742–43.
12 See id. at 757 (emphasis added).
13 See infra notes 62–67, 73–80 and accompanying text.

2017]

HOW THE SUPREME COURT DERAILED FORMAL RULEMAKING

3

Justices’ personal files, including a mock opinion, strongly suggest that the
Justices hurriedly dispatched the formal rulemaking issue because they had
little interest in these admittedly dry and inaccessible rulemaking cases,
which arose under the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction (as opposed to its
discretionary certiorari docket).14 Moreover, the issue of formal
rulemaking’s applicability arose only during the drafting process as an
alternative avenue for two tentative dissenting Justices to join the majority
opinion.15
Whether due to his well-documented distraction or dementia,16 Justice
Douglas, the only Justice with a background in administrative law, did not
initially object to the majority’s unpersuasive reasoning. He came to formal
rulemaking’s defense only later in his dissent to the second and much
better-known decision, United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.17
The case concerned certain per diem rates promulgated under the same
underlying rulemaking provision at issue in Allegheny-Ludlum.18
Immediately before the Court issued its opinion in Allegheny-Ludlum, it
called for additional briefing on the applicability of formal rulemaking in
Florida East Coast Railway.19 Relying significantly upon its decision in
Allegheny-Ludlum, the Court once again held that “after hearing” did not
require formal rulemaking under the APA or the ICC’s enabling act even
for ratemaking,20 the paradigmatic agency action to which formal
rulemaking had previously applied.21
The Justices’ papers suggest that Allegheny-Ludlum rendered Florida
East Coast Railway a fait accompli, stifling the limited persuasive force of
the parties’ briefing and Justice Douglas’s notoriously hard-to-follow
dissent.22 Allegheny-Ludlum’s outsized role in Florida East Coast Railway
is all the more troubling because it perhaps led the Court to proffer
specious arguments that ended any lingering hopes that formal rulemaking

14

See infra notes 106, 108–109 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 103–104 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 138–142 and accompanying text.
17 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
18 See id. at 225–28.
19 See LAWSON, supra note 8, at 220.
20 See Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. at 235.
21 See Nielson, supra note 5, at 244.
22 See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 565 (5th ed.
2010) (describing why “[i]t is difficult to tell whether the dissent, as well as the response
from the majority, was based on different interpretations of the statutory term ‘hearing’ or
on different ways of interpreting and applying the Due Process Clause of the Constitution”);
see also infra notes 131–132.
15
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could retain a portion of its former place in the administrative state.23 The
influence of Allegheny-Ludlum’s sua sponte treatment is clear when one
considers that, months before the Court decided Allegheny-Ludlum and
prior to Justice Rehnquist joining the Court, a majority of the Justices had
already “joined” a circulated draft opinion in Florida East Coast Railway
that would have applied formal rulemaking.24 In short, Allegheny-Ludlum’s
impact is much larger than its fame.
Together, Allegheny-Ludlum and Florida East Coast Railway
(collectively the “Railway Cases”) all but ended formal rulemaking in the
federal administrative state. Many at the time, including the Administrative
Conference of the United States (“ACUS”) led by Antonin Scalia, were
already skeptical of formal rulemaking’s benefits after what was perceived
as a well-publicized formal rulemaking debacle.25 Because of these
decisions and the zeitgeist of the late 1960s and early 1970s, formal
rulemaking fell from a prominent rulemaking device to a perplexing
wrinkle in administrative law.
Recently, however, scholars and Congress have expressed renewed
interest in formal rulemaking. For instance, Congress most likely required
the procedure in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act26 for the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency’s (“OCC”) preemption of state consumerprotection law.27 Congress likely did so as an antidote for longstanding
concerns that regulatory capture and the lack of transparency that
surrounded the OCC’s preemption decisions contributed to the 2008
economic downturn.28 The House has also introduced legislation that would
require formal rulemaking under the Patient Protection and Affordable

23

See infra Part I.
See infra notes 119–123 and accompanying text.
25 See infra Part I.
26 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
27 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(c) (2012). The language in Dodd–Frank (“made on the record
of the proceeding”) does not perfectly track the APA’s triggering language in § 553(c) (“on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing”). But the statute’s use of “on the record,”
which was the key missing language in Allegheny-Ludlum, and the statute’s requirement
that the decision be supported by “substantial evidence” (the standard that applies to formal
rulemaking and adjudication under the APA), see id.; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012), are
likely sufficient for courts to find that Congress clearly required formal proceedings under
the APA. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 757 (1972)
(noting that “precise words ‘on the record’” are not required to render formal proceedings
applicable); United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 251–52 (1973) (noting
that no terms of art are required to invoke formal proceedings).
28 See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22–33 (2015).
24
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Care Act,29 and scholars have recently begun to reconsider formal
rulemaking’s place in the administrative law firmament.30 But these efforts
face significant resistance from inertia rooted in formal rulemaking’s
mythology, the Railway Cases, and decades of disuse. The historical
inquiry into the Railway Cases informs this renewed debate: AlleghenyLudlum is more significant than its obscurity suggests. The sua sponte
treatment of formal rulemaking limits the holding’s persuasive force,
providing a reason to push against inertia and for policymakers and
scholars to consider the merits or demerits of formal rulemaking on its own
terms, removed from the shadows of the Railway Cases.
I.

FORMAL RULEMAKING AND THE RAILWAY CASES

Formal rulemaking is the platypus of administrative law—the
awkward beast that combines rulemaking and adjudication. Governed by
sections 556 and 557 of the APA, formal rulemaking is a process by which
agencies promulgate rules of general application, usually with prospective
effect, based on closed records that ALJs develop in evidentiary hearings.31
More specifically, “[w]hen rules are required by statute to be made on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing,”32 the APA requires a
hearing (whether oral or by written submissions), cross-examination if
necessary, and a transcript of evidence and testimony upon which the
agency must base its rule.33 Generally, the ALJ, who is prohibited from
having certain ex parte communications, may prepare a tentative decision.34
When issuing the final rule, the agency must prepare findings of fact from
the record and conclusions of law.35 The formal rulemaking process
prioritizes participation by affected parties, reasoned decisionmaking, and
transparency over efficiency.36
On-the-record formal rulemaking significantly differs from the much
more common informal notice-and-comment rulemaking. Informal
rulemaking generally requires only that the agency provide notice of its
29

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
30 See Gary S. Lawson, Reviving Formal Rulemaking: Openness and Accountability
for Obamacare, BACKGROUNDER, July 25, 2011, at 1 (considering H.R. 1432, 112th Cong.
(2011)); Nielson, supra note 5, at 253–92.
31 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57 (2012).
32 Id. § 553(c).
33 Id. § 556(a), (d)–(e).
34 Id. § 557(b)–(d). Alternately, an agency may require that the record be certified to it
for initial decision, either in specific instances or as a general rule. Id. § 557(b).
35 Id. § 557(c)(3).
36 See Nielson, supra note 5, at 244–47.
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proposed rule, solicit comments, and provide an explanation for its rule in
which it responds to key comments.37 The key differences between formal
and informal rulemaking, accordingly, are that the latter does not require
any hearing, closed record to support the decision, specific findings of fact
or legal conclusions, or prohibitions on ex parte contact.38 With fewer
procedural hurdles than formal rulemaking, informal rulemaking
acknowledges public participation, transparency, and reasoned
decisionmaking without giving these values the same prominence as formal
rulemaking.39 Rather, it emphasizes efficiency and ensures that agencies
can move nimbly as facts on the ground change.40
Although many agencies used formal rulemaking before and after the
enactment of the APA in 1946, it was perhaps most commonly found in
ratemaking proceedings—that is, the procedure through which agencies set
rates for certain industries, including railroads.41 Ratemakings are
“rulemakings” under the APA.42 Indeed, before the APA, ratemakings
proceeded through evidentiary hearings that were the precursors of APA
formal rulemaking.43 And when the General Counsel of the ICC testified
before a Senate subcommittee whose members castigated the agency for
taking so long to promulgate certain rules, he responded that the ICC was
required to engage in formal rulemaking under the Esch Car Service Act of
1917.44 Indeed, the ICC never asserted in lower-court litigation (or in the
Railway Cases) that formal rulemaking did not apply to the rules at issue.45
But around the time of the Railway Cases, skepticism of formal
rulemaking’s benefits abounded. The Federal Drug Administration’s
(“FDA”) notorious Peanut-Butter Rule led to much of the handwringing.46
The FDA took more than a decade of protracted proceedings to decide
whether peanuts must comprise 87% or 90% of peanut butter.47 The
received wisdom is that it was but one example of regulated parties
purposefully impeding regulatory action by taking advantage of formal
37

5 U.S.C. § 553.
Compare id., with id. § 556(a), (d)–(e).
39 Nielson, supra note 5, at 242.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 244–46, 263.
42 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (defining “rule” to include “the approval or prescription for the
future of rates”).
43 See Nielson, supra note 5, at 244.
44 Esch Car Service Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-19, 40 Stat. 101 (repealed 1978). See
United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 232–33 (1973).
45 LAWSON, supra note 8, at 220–22.
46 See Nielson, supra note 5, at 247–48.
47 Id.
38
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rulemaking’s required procedures.48 The debacle largely led to ACUS’s
stated view in 1971 and 1972 that Congress should never require formal
rulemaking, instead leaving it up to agencies’ discretion.49
But, as Aaron Nielson has chronicled, the Peanut-Butter Rule was a
poor exemplar. First, the FDA failed to implement procedures that were
common in other agencies to facilitate multiparty hearings.50 Second, even
without procedural safeguards, the hearing itself only took thirty days; the
lengthy delays before and after the hearing arose from the agency’s failure
to prioritize what it viewed as an insignificant matter.51 Third, the infamous
8000-page transcript, while long, is on par with most judicial hearings.52
And finally, other agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture, used
formal rulemaking much more efficiently and without complaint from
regulated parties, including for complex matters.53 Nevertheless, the two
Railway Cases arose amidst a zeitgeist that opposed formal rulemaking,
and the Court took the opportunity to turn the mismatched platypus into an
exceedingly rare unicorn.
The first, lesser-known decision was Allegheny-Ludlum. There, the
Court approved ICC rules that required rented railcars to be returned in the
direction of the borrowing railroad, which were adopted to ease a
longstanding, national railcar shortage.54 In accord with longstanding
practice and the Esch Act’s requirement that the ICC establish rules “after
hearing,”55 the ICC had promulgated the rule through formal rulemaking
proceedings under the APA.56 Responding to the railroads’ argument that
the ICC had departed from the requirements of sections 556 and 557
(which, recall, apply only to formal proceedings), the Court held sua
sponte57 that the agency was not bound to follow formal rulemaking
procedures. The phrase “after hearing” in the Esch Act was not sufficiently
similar to the triggering language for formal rulemaking under the
48

See id. (citing Robert W. Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug
Administration, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1132, 1142 (1972)).
49 See id. at 250 (citing Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative
Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469, 504 (1986)). Later, in 1976, ACUS explained that
formal rulemaking may be appropriate for scientifically complex or significantly costly
issues. See id. at 250–51.
50 Id. at 248.
51 Id. at 248–49.
52 See id. at 249.
53 See id. at 273.
54 United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 742–45 (1972).
55 Id. at 757 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (repealed 1978)).
56 Id.
57 See LAWSON, supra note 8, at 220–21.
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APA: “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.”58 Instead,
the Court held that only informal rulemaking was necessary, and the ICC
had satisfied its requirements.59 The procedural issue that led the Court to
address formal rulemaking’s applicability was a minor point in the
railroads’ briefing and was not even mentioned in the United States’s reply
brief or at oral argument.60
As Gary Lawson has detailed, the Court’s brief analysis is hardly
compelling.61 Based on longstanding historical practice, the context of the
1917 Esch Act drafting, and continued agency views, “after hearing” was
almost certainly intended to invoke formal rulemaking.62 The Court relied
on three authorities for its contrary position.63 But one—a famous treatise
by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, along with a cf. citation to a D.C. Circuit
decision that the treatise cited—referred to formal adjudication, not
rulemaking.64 One concerned a statute that did not require any hearing at
all.65 And while the third required “on the record” language for formal
rulemaking, it relied only on The Attorney General’s Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act, which Lawson argues stated the opposite.66
Indeed, the authoritative Manual, promulgated as a guide to the APA when
58

Allegheny-Ludlum, 406 U.S. at 757.
Id. at 757–58.
60 See LAWSON, supra note 8, at 220–21.
61 See LAWSON, supra note 9, at 141.
62 Id. at 141, 145.
63 See Allegheny-Ludlum, 406 U.S. at 757 (citing KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.08 (1958); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Dillon,
344 F.2d 497, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1965); and Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 400 F.2d 778,
785 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
64 See DAVIS, supra note 63, § 13.08 n.30 (citing First Nat’l Bank of McKeesport v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 225 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1955)).
65 See Seagram & Sons, 344 F.2d at 499 (“The statute does not provide for a hearing
on label applications, and no hearing was held.”).
66 See LAWSON, supra note 8, at 221 (considering Siegel, 400 F.2d at 785). Lawson’s
argument may overstate the case, but his broader point is sound. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, which the Court has frequently referred
to as persuasive authority, has a relatively extended discussion of whether “on the record”
language is necessary to trigger APA formality on pages 32–35. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 32–35 (1947). To
be sure, the Manual indicates that one can infer that agencies are required to use formal
rulemaking when agencies have the authority to promulgate rates after a hearing. But it also
noted that “[t]here is persuasive legislative history to the effect that the Congress did not
intend [formal rulemaking] to apply . . . where the substantive statute merely required a
hearing.” Id. at 34. Although I think that Lawson’s reading is reasonable, I do not think that
the Manual is as clearly contrary to the Court’s holding as he suggests. Nevertheless, I am
persuaded that, as a matter of historical context for the Esch Act and ratemaking generally,
the Court’s decision was wrong.
59
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it was enacted, has an extended discussion in which it contends—notably
contrary to agencies’ and the executive branch’s disfavor of formal
rulemaking—that formal rulemaking can apply even in the absence of “on
the record” statutory language because of legislative intent, history, and the
prescribed standards for judicial review.67
The second decision, decided the following term, was Florida East
Coast Railway. The Court approved of certain per diem rates to address the
same national boxcar shortage at issue in Allegheny-Ludlum.68 The ICC
promulgated these rates and the rules in Allegheny-Ludlum under the same
statutory grant of rulemaking authority.69 After issuing its opinion in
Allegheny-Ludlum, the Court requested additional briefing in Florida East
Coast Railway on whether formal rulemaking was required.70 Reaffirming
Allegheny-Ludlum, the Court held that neither the APA nor the Esch Act
itself, based on its amendment history and text, required formal rulemaking
for the ICC’s ratemaking.71 Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Stewart,
argued in an often difficult-to-follow dissent that due process of some kind
required formal proceedings in Florida East Coast Railway, but not
Allegheny-Ludlum, because the former concerned rates that created “new
financial liability.”72
As with Allegheny-Ludlum, Lawson has argued that the majority
decision was not persuasive. First, even assuming that the APA did not
require an oral rulemaking hearing, the 1917 Esch Act certainly did.
Lawson argues that it was uncontroverted that everyone in 1917 understood
that “after hearing” required an oral hearing because of due process
concerns over setting rates.73 The Court, however, held to the contrary.74
Determining that no legislative or textual history informed the meaning of
“after hearing,” the Court held that it could incorporate the APA’s broad
understanding of “hearing” (which includes both oral and written
hearings).75 “After hearing” simply required some kind of hearing, the
Court held, and not necessarily an oral one.76 The problem with this

67 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT,
supra note 66, at 32–35.
68 United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 224, 230 (1973).
69 Id. at 230.
70 See LAWSON, supra note 8, at 220.
71 Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 238.
72 Id. at 252 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
73 See LAWSON, supra note 9, at 144–45.
74 Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 241.
75 Id. at 239.
76 Id. at 240–41.
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argument is that the APA was enacted nearly three decades after the Esch
Act.77 The majority attempted to circumvent this temporal problem by
noting that the Esch Act had been amended in 1966 after the 1946 APA.78
But the amendments had nothing to do with the “after hearing” language.79
Finally, the fact that “hearing” might be open-ended in the APA itself does
not tell us what the Esch Act meant by “hearing” in this context—a context
that history unquestionably indicated had required an oral hearing.80
The upshot from both of these decisions is that “unless a statute uses
‘text quite close to the magic words, on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing,’ an agency can opt to use the more truncated informal
rulemaking instead.”81 Which words would be sufficiently close to “on the
record” is far from clear. If the significant contextual and historical support
for formal rulemaking that even The Attorney General’s Manual deems
central to the inquiry were insufficient in the Railway Cases, it is hard to
fathom what words would suffice.82 And because agencies almost never
voluntarily choose formal rulemaking, formal rulemaking has become “a
null set.”83
II.

BEHIND THE SCENES IN THE RAILWAY CASES

If formal rulemaking’s applicability was not at issue in the underlying
Railway Cases before they reached the Supreme Court, why then did the
Court reach the issue, and why did it produce such unpersuasive opinions?
I turned to Justices Rehnquist’s, Stewart’s, and Powell’s papers on the
Railway Cases to find out, as well as a limited collection of materials
assembled from the Justices’ files for the Burger Court Opinion Writing
Database (“Burger Court Files”).84
I selected Justice Rehnquist’s papers, available at the Hoover Institute
at Stanford University, because he authored both opinions and would thus

77

See id. at 237.
See id. at 240.
79 Id. at 234–35.
80 LAWSON, supra note 9, at 145–46.
81 Nielson, supra note 5, at 240 (quoting Michael P. Healy, Florida East Coast
Railway and the Structure of Administrative Law, 58 ADMIN L. REV. 1039, 1039 (2006)).
82 See LAWSON, supra note 9, at 141 (“[T]he Esch Car Service Act of 1917 presented
as strong a case for formal rulemaking under the APA as any statute that does not use the
magic ‘on the record’ language will ever present. That is why the case is so powerful . . . .”).
83 Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 106 (2003).
84 THE
BURGER
COURT
OPINION
WRITING
DATABASE,
http://home.gwu.edu/~wahlbeck/Personal_Homepage/The_Burger_Court_Opinion_Writing
_Database.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) (hereinafter “Burger Court Files”).
78
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be the most likely of the Justices to have kept relevant materials. In light of
the narrow nature of this project, I limited myself to collecting only those
of the other Justices’ papers that were easily accessible at low cost. Justice
Stewart’s papers were housed at Yale Law School and provided at no cost.
Likewise, Justice Powell’s papers at Washington and Lee University
School of Law were provided at no cost.85 The remaining Justices’ papers
are housed at the Library of Congress and researching those files would
have required more time and expense than the relatively limited scope of
this project warranted.86 Fortunately, the selected papers proved relatively
helpful and consistent with one another, and I was able to supplement them
with the Burger Court Files. Those latter files provided key additional
materials that appeared to come primarily from the files of Justices
Marshall and Blackmun.

A. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.
Justice Rehnquist’s papers for Allegheny-Ludlum contained several
unique documents but they were rarely identified or organized
systematically and were often missing several pages. Nonetheless, I have
attempted to reconstruct the opinion-drafting process by considering
document formats, argument development, and dates provided on a few
documents. The following documents were the most relevant and are
discussed in more detail below:
An opinion-circulation table (“Opinion-Circulation Table”), which
includes dates of when the other Justices joined the opinion and the
assignment history;
An undated draft opinion that appears to be a preliminary draft
(“Preliminary Draft”);87
An undated addendum that appears to be related to the Preliminary
Draft concerning whether the Esch Act requires formal rulemaking
(“Preliminary Draft Addendum”);

85 Justice Powell did not participate in Florida East Coast Railway. See United States
v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 246 (1973). He recused himself because of his
interest in one of the parties in the case, Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. See Justice
Powell’s Papers, United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., No. 70-279, Ltr. from C. Parnell
(June 7, 1972), http://law2.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1279.
86 Chief Justice Burger’s papers are currently housed at the College of William and
Mary but are closed to researchers until 2026.
87 This document is missing pages five through ten, and hard-to-decipher, handwritten
notes that seem to concern an unrelated speech appear on the back of the pages.
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portions of a May 17, 1972 draft opinion (“May 17 Draft”), a May 18,
1972 “redraft” (“May 18 Redraft”), and a “redraft” from May 19, 1972 that
included the formal rulemaking issue (“May 19 Redraft”);
An official first draft opinion from May 1972 (“First Draft Opinion”)
with a notation reading “NOT CIRCULATED”;
A marked-up version of the official second draft opinion from May
1972 with a notation indicating that it was circulated (“Marked-Up Second
Draft Opinion”);
A May 31, 1972 “join” letter from Justice Powell (“Powell Join
Letter”); and
An undated letter from David Kendall, law clerk for Justice White
(“Kendall Letter”).
To my great disappointment, Justice Rehnquist’s files do not contain
any bench memoranda for the Railway Cases. Michael Meehan, the clerk
assigned to Allegheny-Ludlum, said in a phone interview that he did not
think that he prepared a bench memo for the case because he could not find
one in his personal files.88 But because there is also no memo for Florida
East Coast Railway, it is possible that Rehnquist had them removed from
the files. After all, an informal memorandum in Justice Jackson’s files for
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka89—which Rehnquist asserted that
he drafted as Justice Jackson’s law clerk only as a summary of Jackson’s
pro-segregation views—caused great controversy in his confirmation
proceedings.90 Regardless, Rehnquist’s files lack the best evidence of how
the opinions in the Railway Cases developed.
Nevertheless, developments during the drafting of Allegheny-Ludlum
suggest that no one identified the formal rulemaking issue before oral
argument. The Preliminary Draft did not refer to the formal-rulemaking
issue.91 Indeed, the Preliminary Draft did not refer to the APA at all.92
Relatedly, a bench memo from Justice Powell’s papers does not refer to
any procedural concerns or the applicability of formal rulemaking, aside

88 Telephone Interview with Michael Meehan, Former Clerk, Justice William
Rehnquist (July 13, 2016). Michael Meehan, a graduate of the John P. Rogers College of
Law at the University of Arizona, confirmed in a phone interview that he was the clerk
assigned to the case. I appreciate his willingness to speak with me about his recollection of
his time in chambers (with the understanding that he would not share matters related to the
merits of the decisionmaking process).
89
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
90 See Brad Snyder & John Q. Barrett, Rehnquist’s Missing Letter: A Former Law
Clerk’s 1955 Thoughts on Justice Jackson and Brown, 53 B.C. L. REV. 631, 632–34 (2012).
91 See Preliminary Draft.
92 See id.
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from arguing that the ICC’s findings were sufficiently specific.93 The
Preliminary Draft instead appeared to assume that formal proceedings
applied. It twice referred to Universal Camera v. NLRB,94 a leading formaladjudication decision, and discussed the proper weight to give the
difference in opinion between the commissioners and the ALJ who
received the relevant evidence.95 Likewise, the opinion applied the
“substantial evidence” standard of review, which under the APA applies
only to formal (as opposed to informal) rulemakings.96 At the same time,
the draft referred to pre-APA decisions to argue that because a rule, as
opposed to an adjudication, was at issue, “[n]o broad specific findings of
fact are necessary.”97 Because the APA requires factual findings for only
formal rulemaking,98 this reference could suggest that the seeds of Justice
Rehnquist’s belief that formal rulemaking did not apply existed even then.
Taken altogether, however, the draft suggests that the author was generally
not thinking about the APA’s applicability.
In the Preliminary Draft Addendum, the author first addressed the
formal-rulemaking issue.99 That discussion refers to no authorities other
than the APA itself.100 But by the May 19 Redraft, which incorporated and
added revisions from the preliminary draft, the draft opinion cited the
Kenneth Culp Davis treatise and the D.C. Circuit decision to which it
referred.101 The additional authorities in the final opinion were added to the
circulated Second Draft Opinion in handwritten revisions (possibly from
another chambers).102 In other words, the drafting history provides evidence

93 Justice Powell’s Papers, Covert E. Parnell, III (law clerk), Bench Memo, No. 71–
227, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steep Corp. at 9–10.
94 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
95 See Preliminary Draft at 13, 22. The fact that the ICC overruled the ALJ’s report
led Justice Powell, as a tentative matter, to vote to affirm the lower court’s ruling that
vacated the rule. See Justice Powell’s Papers, Tentative Impressions, No. 71–227, U.S. v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., at 3 (Mar. 27, 1972). He noted that he would wait to read
Justice Rehnquist’s circulated opinion before writing a short dissent. See id. at 4.
96 See Preliminary Draft at 16–17; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012). The final opinion also
includes two references to “substantial evidence.” See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum
Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 746, 753 (1972).
97 See Preliminary Draft at 13.
98 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A).
99 See Preliminary Draft Addendum at 2.
100 See id. at 3.
101 See May 19 Redraft at 23–25; see also First Draft Op. at 15 (incorporating revisions
from May 19 Redraft).
102 Compare Marked-Up Second Draft Op. at 15 (with handwritten additional
authorities), with Justice Powell’s Papers, Second Draft Op. (circulated May 30, 1972)
(including earlier handwritten additions on marked-up draft).
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that the Court did not identify the formal-rulemaking issue until well after
the drafting process began.
Based on revisions to the drafts and Justice Powell’s conference notes,
it appears that addressing formal rulemaking’s applicability did more than
simply get rid of a stray procedural challenge in the parties’ briefing.
Justice Powell indicated in his post-oral argument notes that he was
tentatively voting to dissent from the majority opinion because the ICC’s
overruling of the trial examiner’s recommendation undermined the rule’s
presumption of validity.103 Indeed, the citation to Universal Camera v.
NLRB in Rehnquist’s Preliminary Draft discussed above appears to have
been added to respond to Justice Powell’s concern because the case
centered on the relationship between an ALJ’s findings and the agency’s
acceptance of those findings in formal adjudication.104 Yet by revising the
draft to hold that formal rulemaking was not required, the concerns over the
relationship between the ALJ’s findings, the ICC’s final decision, and the
necessity of a closed evidentiary record silently fell away.
The files demonstrate, too, that the Rehnquist Chambers did not
particularly enjoy the case, which, recall, arrived under the Court’s
mandatory appellate jurisdiction.105 A very amusing mock conclusion to the
Preliminary Draft makes this abundantly clear:
Finally, we must confess that we [couldn’t] care less where the
box cars of the world go. Box cars have come and box cars have
gone, and still there are box cars. Since the Commission is the
boxcar expert of the great United States, and because we yearn to
ease our docket, we [remand] with directions never to send us
another box car case.106
Unfortunately for the Rehnquist Chambers, another boxcar case from
the mandatory-jurisdiction docket—Florida East Coast Railway—was
waiting in the wings because the Court had placed it on hold until after
deciding Allegheny-Ludlum.107
The Rehnquist Chambers’ lack of enthusiasm was contagious. The
Kendall Letter is another remarkable document in the Rehnquist files that
suggests to humorous effect how little the other chambers thought of the
103 See Justice Powell’s Papers, Tentative Impressions, No. 71–227, AlleghenyLudlum v. U.S. Steel Corp., at 3 (Mar. 27, 1972).
104 See Preliminary Draft at 22–23; Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,
496 (1951).
105 See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 743 (1972)
(“We noted probable jurisdiction . . . .”).
106 See Preliminary Draft at 23.
107 See List of “Cases Heretofore Held for Opinions” at 10.

2017]

HOW THE SUPREME COURT DERAILED FORMAL RULEMAKING

15

case. The letter, “[o]n behalf of the ‘End the Term in OT 71’ Committee of
31,” informs Justice Rehnquist that his opinion in Allegheny-Ludlum was
“nominated for the Parnelli Jones [a former American racecar driver]
Memorial Award for the most supersonic opinion of the year.”108 Why
supersonic? The opinion “picked up three ‘joins’ on its first day in
circulation, four on its second, and . . . the final ‘join’ on its third day
out.”109 In other words, the decision was the most quickly circulated
opinion among the chambers and the fastest to obtain signoff. The fact that
the other chambers joined the first draft within three days suggests that the
Justices did not find the decision meaningful, difficult, or interesting. After
all, the final opinion almost entirely tracks the Second Draft Opinion with
its limited revisions, suggesting that the other chambers were not
meaningfully troubled by the sua sponte discussion of formal rulemaking’s
inapplicability.110
The quick turnaround is all the more surprising because the Justices at
their conference were not clearly unanimous in seeking to reverse. Justice
Powell’s conference notes list four votes as “tentative,”111 with Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Powell tentatively voting to dissent.112 Justice
Stewart’s notes indicate that Justice Blackmun’s vote to join the majority
was also only tentative.113 Yet, despite perhaps a majority of the Court
expressing early reservations, the Court produced a unanimous opinion in

108 Kendall Ltr. (emphasis added). An attached picture of Justice Rehnquist to the letter
obscures some of the text. The obscured text does not appear relevant to Allegheny-Ludlum.
109 Id. Kendall’s circulation history is consistent with the Opinion-Circulation Table.
See Opinion-Circulation Table. That table indicates that on May 30, 1972, Justice Rehnquist
circulated only one draft (which, it indicates, was actually the Second Draft Opinion).
Justices Douglas and Brennan joined that day. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
White, and Powell joined on May 31, and Justice Blackmun joined on June 1. A join letter
from Justice Marshall to Justice Rehnquist in Justice Powell’s files reveals that he joined on
May 30, 1972. See Justice Powell’s Papers, Ltr. to Justice Rehnquist from Justice Marshall
(May 30, 1972).
110 Compare Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, with Justice Powell’s
Papers, Second Draft Op. (circulated May 30, 1972).
111 See Justice Powell’s Papers, Conf. Notes, No. 71–227, United States v. AlleghenyLudlum Steep Corp. (undated).
112 See id. Justice Powell wrote to the Chief Justice expressing his inclination to join
Justice Rehnquist’s majority after reading the draft on the first day of its circulation. See
Justice Powell’s Papers, Ltr. to The Chief Justice from Justice Powell (May 30, 1972).
113 See Justice Stewart’s Papers, Conf. Notes, No. 71–227, U.S. v. Allegheny-Ludlum
Steel Corp. Justice Rehnquist’s notes are consistent. His Opinion-Circulation Table states
that the Chief Justice joined on May 31, “despite early vote to affirm.” Opinion-Circulation
Table. In the Powell Join Letter, Justice Powell included a handwritten note saying, “Your
excellent opinion won me over.” Justice Powell’s Papers, Ltr. to The Chief Justice from
Justice Powell (May 30, 1972).
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three days after only one draft’s circulation.114 Notably, Justice Powell
provided no suggested revisions to Justice Rehnquist’s circulated draft,115
despite having tentatively voted to dissent based on the difference of
opinion between the ICC and the examiner.116 Given the Justices’
conference, the rapid unanimity suggests that the formal rulemaking issue
was of little interest to the entire Court, perhaps especially at the end of the
term in June in a case the Court was forced to hear. Nonetheless, it served
as a pragmatic way to calm doubts over other issues.
B. United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.
The Rehnquist files for Florida East Coast Railway were not nearly as
enlightening or entertaining as those for Allegheny-Ludlum.117 But the
Burger Court Files and the files of Justice Stewart, who joined Justice
Douglas’s dissent in Florida East Coast Railway, provide some limited
insight as to the development of the majority and dissenting opinions. They
further suggest why the latter did not cause the other Justices more concern
over the formal rulemaking issue.
Perhaps most surprisingly, months before Allegheny-Ludlum was
decided, an early per curiam draft opinion for Florida East Coast Railway
noted that formal rulemaking applied and commanded the support of a
majority of the then-eight-member Court.118 Before Justice Rehnquist
joined the Court in January 1972, Justice Douglas circulated a per curiam
opinion that expressly indicated in a footnote that formal rulemaking
applied and that the controversy concerned whether written submissions
were permissible in the formal rulemaking at issue.119 Justices Brennan,120
Stewart,121 and Marshall122 all joined that opinion, and Justice Blackmun
agreed that formal rulemaking applied in a concurring opinion.123 This
meant that there were at least five out of eight possible votes for applying
formal rulemaking’s requirements in Florida East Coast Railway. Why
114

See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
See Justice Powell’s Papers, Second Draft Op. (circulated on May, 30, 1972).
116 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
117 They generally contain only majority- and dissenting-opinion drafts (usually
without many marked revisions) and “join” letters.
118 See Burger Court Files, No. 70–279, United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., Second Per
Curiam Draft (Oct. 5, 1971).
119 Id.
120 Burger Court Files, Ltr. from J. Brennan to J. Douglas (Oct. 6, 1971).
121 Burger Court Files, Ltr. from J. Stewart to J. Douglas (Oct. 7, 1971).
122 Burger Court Files, Ltr. from J. Marshall to J. Douglas (Oct. 21, 1971).
123 Burger Court Files No. 70–279, United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., J. Blackmun,
Concurring Op., First Draft (Oct. 8, 1971).
115
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exactly the opinion was set aside and not issued before Justice Rehnquist
joined the Court (or without his participation after he joined) is not clear
from the limited files.
Instead, as the initial Florida East Coast Railway decision lingered in
circulation, Justice Rehnquist circulated Allegheny-Ludlum.124 On June 5,
1972, after Justice Rehnquist had circulated his Allegheny-Ludlum opinion,
Justice Douglas circulated his fifth draft per curiam opinion in Florida East
Coast Railway.125 It had a longer first footnote that briefly—and without
any analysis—distinguished Allegheny-Ludlum as concerning general
rulemaking provisions that did not concern per diem rates for which
Congress required factual inquiries.126 By at least that same day (two days
before the Court issued Allegheny-Ludlum), Justice Rehnquist had
expressed his discomfort with deciding Florida East Coast Railway and
Justice Douglas had suggested that the Justices consider how to proceed at
a future conference.127 After the Court decided Allegheny-Ludlum, Justice
Rehnquist suggested that the parties brief the issue of whether formal
rulemaking applied in Florida East Coast Railway,128 and a majority of the
Justices agreed without explaining why.129 After briefing, as history knows,
the Court held that formal rulemaking did not apply in Florida East Coast
Railway.130
But one striking takeaway from Justice Stewart’s conference notes was
that Allegheny-Ludlum, and not the supplemental briefing, seemed to all
but decide the case for at least four of the eight participating Justices. In his
conference notes, Justice Stewart noted that the Chief Justice and Justices
White and Marshall voted to reverse based on Allegheny-Ludlum.131
Similarly, he indicates that Justice Rehnquist voted to reverse “because of
124

See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
See Burger Court Files, No. 70–279, United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., Fifth Per
Curiam Draft (June 5, 1971).
126 Id. at 1 n.1.
127 Burger Court Files, Ltr. from J. Douglas to C.J. (June 5, 1972). Justice Douglas
ended the letter by saying, “The new sentence that Bill Rehnquist put into his Allegheny
opinion (71–227) eliminates any possibility of a conflict with Florida East Coast.” Id. It is
not clear to me to which sentence Justice Douglas referred. But his optimism was, it turns
out, misplaced.
128 Burger Court Files, Ltr. from J. Rehnquist to C.J. (June 14, 1972).
129 See Burger Court Files, Ltr. from J. Douglas to Conf. (June 15, 1972); Burger Court
Files, Ltr. from J. Blackmun to J. Rehnquist (June 16, 1972); Burger Court Files, Ltr. from
J. Brennan to J. Rehnquist (June 16, 1972); Burger Court Files, Ltr. from J. Stewart to J.
Rehnquist (June 20, 1972).
130 See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 227–28 (1973).
131 See Justice Stewart’s Papers, Conf. Notes, No. 70–279, United States v. Fla. E.
Coast Ry.
125
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§ 553,” which applied (as the Florida East Coast Railway opinion that he
wrote for the Court stated) because of Allegheny-Ludlum.132 Justice Stewart
does not indicate why the other Justices joined the majority.133
Justice Stewart’s papers also inform the dissenting opinion. Recall that
Justice Douglas’s often hard-to-follow dissent generally relied upon
unclear notions of due process to argue that the regulated parties were
entitled to the protections of sections 556 and 557 of the APA.134 Similar to
his fifth draft per curiam opinion that he circulated around the time the
Court issued Allegheny-Ludlum, Justice Douglas’s dissent argued that the
Court should distinguish the rates in Florida East Coast Railway, which
created financial liability, from rules like those at issue in AlleghenyLudlum, which did not.135 With historical practice in mind, the dissent
contended that the Court should have read “hearing” under the Esch Act to
require formal rulemaking under the APA for rates but not other rules.136
This distinction could have found some basis in historical practice and the
Attorney General’s Manual,137 but the dissent did not meaningfully refer to
either argument.
During the early 1970s, Justice Douglas was not at his best. Although
a well-known stroke in 1974 severely diminished his faculties,138 he was
distracted before then by political, financial, health, and interpersonal
problems. His financial dealings had led, in part, to an unsuccessful
impeachment attempt.139 He had suffered heart problems,140 and he had
notoriously bad relations with his staff and law clerks.141 Later, Justice
Brennan said that Justice Douglas’s “last ten years on the Court were
marked by the slovenliness of his writing and the mistakes that he
constantly made.”142
The dissenting drafts provide some evidence of Justice Douglas’s
distraction in Florida East Coast Railway. The first draft of his dissenting
132

Id.
See id.
134 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
135 See Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. at 247 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
136 See id. at 252–53.
137 See supra note 66.
138 Justice Douglas’s decline after a stroke in 1974 is well documented. See Richard
Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal
and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507, 1539 n.161 (2012).
139 See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O.
DOUGLAS 396, 400–01, 433, 441 (2003).
140 See, e.g., id. at 447–48.
141 See, e.g., id. at 407–13, 431, 457.
142 Id. at 386.
133
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opinion read like a majority opinion, stating “We affirm”143—a remnant
from his per curiam drafts.144 In his fifth draft dissent (after earlier drafts
with few revisions), he reformulated his introductory paragraphs in a way
that nearly cost him Justice Stewart’s vote. After using strong rhetoric
concerning the majority’s “sharp break with traditional concepts of
procedural due process,” he prominently relied upon due process of some
kind to require “a full hearing that includes the right to present oral
testimony, cross examine witness [sic], and to present oral argument.”145
He argued that the APA required these procedures anyway under section
554—which concerns only adjudications, not rulemakings—because the
ratemaking at issue “is certainly adjudicatory, not legislative in the
customary sense.”146 Recall that, contrary to Justice Douglas’s
pronouncement, the APA expressly defines ratemaking as rulemaking, not
adjudication.147 This was too much for Justice Stewart. He asked Justice
Douglas to delete his name from joining and instead add that “Mr. Justice
Stewart joins in this dissent except insofar as it relies on 5 U.S.C. § 554.”148
In response, Justice Douglas revised his sixth and final draft to refer to the
APA’s rulemaking provisions.149
III. LESSONS FROM THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS
The Justices’ papers strongly suggest that they did not meaningfully
engage with formal rulemaking’s applicability in the Railway Cases,
whether because of the issue’s sua sponte treatment, the misplaced reliance
on Allegheny-Ludlum to decide Florida East Coast Railway, or the failure
of Justice Douglas’s dissenting opinion to alert his colleagues to the
problems in the majority opinion. But why should anyone care?
First. The railway decisions were more significant than they may
appear. With formal rulemaking’s quick banishment, administrative law
lost, for all practical purposes, one of only four key categories of agency

143 See Burger Court Files, United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., No. 70–279, Second
Draft (Oct. 5, 1971).
144 See Justice Stewart’s Papers, First Draft Dissenting Op. at 1 (circulated Jan. 6,
1973).
145 Justice Stewart’s Papers, Fifth Draft Dissenting Op. at 1 (circulated Jan. 17, 1973).
146 Id. at 2.
147 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
148 Justice Stewart’s Papers, Ltr. to Justice Douglas from Justice Stewart (Jan. 18,
1973).
149 See Justice Stewart’s Papers, Sixth Draft Dissenting Op. at 1–2 (circulated Jan. 19,
1973); see also United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 247 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
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action under the APA.150 All that remained were informal rulemaking,
formal adjudication, and informal adjudication.151 Moreover, administrative
law lost a form of rulemaking that is formal for a reason: the procedure was
intended to protect regulated parties from administrative overreach.152 As
Nielson has recounted, formal rulemaking under the APA was a
compromise to ensure reasoned decisionmaking and transparency.153
Indeed, formal rulemaking’s antecedent itself arose as an important
compromise in the development of the early modern administrative state.154
It was the ICC that in 1887, after significant debate in Congress,
established the judicial-agency model now ubiquitous in federal
agencies.155 And Congress continued to paint the ICC with a judicial hue
even when it engaged in rulemaking by granting the agency the power to
make rates only after it provided a “full [trial-like] hearing.”156
In formal rulemaking’s nearly complete absence, informal rulemaking
took over in mutated form. Courts rendered informal rulemaking more
formal. Very shortly after the Railway Cases, courts began to impose more
stringent procedural protections on informal rulemaking,157 including by
requiring more notice158 and more detailed agency explanations.159 In fact,
one scholar has gone so far as to say that “[t]oday, the informal rulemaking
process is almost as time consuming and expensive as the formal
rulemaking process.”160 The more-or-less extinction of formal rulemaking
created a new ecosystem within which other organisms changed (or

150

See Rubin, supra note 83, at 106.
Id.
152 See Nielson, supra note 5, at 244.
153 See id. at 245–47.
154 Id. at 244.
155 See generally Hiroshi Okayama, The Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Genesis of America’s Judicialized Administrative State, J. GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA
(forthcoming).
156 See Nielson, supra note 5, at 244–45.
157 See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 512 (2009) (noting debate over rulemaking’s requirements led courts to “extract[]
from the language—or assumed purpose—of section 553” many procedural requirements).
158 See LAWSON, supra note 8, at 263 (describing the judiciary’s changed
understanding of notice’s purpose as checking agency action as opposed to facilitating
agency action).
159 See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 22, 592–93 (discussing how courts have required more
from agencies as to their explanation over the decades).
160 Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public
Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L.
REV. 277, 282 (1998).
151
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continued their mutation) to fill the void left by its absence.161 Although the
holdings in the Railway Cases nominally affected only formal rulemaking
itself, they had a much more significant impact on administrative law writ
large.
To be sure, formal rulemaking was never required of all agencies or
for all matters.162 It was, however, an important and robust form of agency
action prior to the Railway Cases—even “dominat[ing] the administrative
law landscape.”163 And the increasingly shared consensus that formal
rulemaking was too inefficient for a modern regulatory state may have led
to its decline without the Court’s intervention.164 But the Railway Cases did
not permit the resolution of those debates before largely shunning one of
only four categories of agency action.
Second. Allegheny-Ludlum provides a striking example of the dangers
of deciding matters sua sponte. The Court hamstrung formal rulemaking
without so much as briefing in Allegheny-Ludlum, and conference notes
indicate that decision rendered later briefing in Florida East Coast Railway
practically nugatory.165 The Court appeared to consider the issue in
Allegheny-Ludlum for only three days and without input from the parties or
argument concerning the historical nature of formal rulemaking and its
provenance within ICC matters.166 The absence of briefing appears
meaningful because the Court ruled that formal rulemaking did not apply
without citing on-point, persuasive authorities.167 With the parties’ input,
the Court could have given the issue sustained attention and perhaps
recognized the deficiency in its poorly reasoned arguments in Florida East
Coast Railway. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist’s hesitation to decide Florida
East Coast Railway without briefing on the subject of formal rulemaking’s
applicability should have alerted him to the need for briefing in Allegheny-

161

Moreover, circuit courts immediately after the Railway Cases continued to require
agencies to provide hearings and formalities in excess of those required by the APA, but the
Supreme Court unanimously stopped that practice in 1978. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 185, 194 (1996)
(discussing impact of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978)).
162 See Robert W. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General
Applicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF.
L. REV. 1276, 1278 (1972).
163 Nielson, supra note 5, at 246 (quoting ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A GUIDE
TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING, at ix (2d ed. 1991)).
164 See id. at 250–51.
165 See supra notes 131–133 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
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Ludlum.168 Had they called for such briefing in Allegheny-Ludlum, perhaps
Justice Douglas’s dissent in Florida East Coast Railway would have been
spared the difficult task of alerting his colleagues to the historical
significance of formal rulemaking.
I do not go so far as to assert that the Railway Cases, based on their
troubling provenance and problematic reasoning, should be overturned or
ignored. They are precedents, albeit underwhelming ones. And they do
perhaps provide a useful, limited holding: a clear statement rule that
requires Congress to speak unambiguously when it seeks to use formal
rulemaking by saying “on the record” or something extremely similar.169
Such a rule can save judicial and agency resources in seeking to ascertain
congressional intent. But the utility of that holding comes at a cost. The
Court, as The Attorney General’s Manual perhaps most poignantly reveals,
ignored what had been a clearly understood legislative preference for a
contextual inquiry into whether formal rulemaking was required—not
magic words or something akin to them.170
Regardless of formal rulemaking’s virtues (or lack thereof), formal
rulemaking was a hard-fought, well-understood compromise between those
that favored robust protections for regulated entities and those that
preferred a nimble and robust administrative state.171 The choice to
renegotiate the deal struck in the APA was not the Court’s to make. The
Court should have instead carefully considered formal rulemaking’s
applicability under the Esch Act only after significant briefing, historical
inquiry, and contextualization. That inquiry would have been faithful to the
APA.
Third. The Court’s decisionmaking process makes it clear that,
contrary to myth, the Court did not set out to resolve the underlying debate
over formal rulemaking’s virtues or faults or establish that Congress had
already done so. I do not join the debate over formal rulemaking’s virtues
or faults. That debate should accordingly address the merits of formal
rulemaking without placing undue weight on the ahistorical approach of the
Railway Cases. The recently revived debate had lain dormant for
questionable reasons. Although Nielson thoughtfully demonstrated that the
FDA’s infamous Peanut-Butter Rule was not the bête noir it was once
thought to be,172 scholars have largely dismissed formal rulemaking as a

168
169
170
171
172

See supra notes 128–130 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
See Nielson, supra note 5, at 243–47.
See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
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useless device based on the FDA’s ineffective use of the process.173
Likewise, the myth of formal rulemaking’s shortcomings can lead
scholars to quickly praise Florida East Coast Railway as simply following
precedent (Allegheny-Ludlum) and historical practice, and thereby
justifiably disengage from the underlying merits of formal rulemaking. For
instance, one leading treatise argues that Florida East Coast Railway was
properly decided because, aside from being consistent with AlleghenyLudlum, its “refusal to presume congressional intent to impose trial-type
rulemaking is consistent with the law at the time the APA was passed.”174
But the decision that the authors cite to support their assertion, Norwegian
Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States,175 merely confirms that a
contextual inquiry is necessary. The Court in that case refused to require a
trial-like hearing because, among other contextual factors, the agency
merely provided recommendations on tariffs to the President and not rules
with the force of law like those at issue in the Railway Cases.176
Congress, agencies, and scholars of different ideological stripes should
continue to consider the merits of formal rulemaking by engaging with
Nielson’s thoughtful defense of formal rulemaking in certain contexts.177
Formal rulemaking, after all, does not have a clear political valence. To be
sure, Republicans in the House have supported formal rulemaking in an
apparent effort to hobble “Obamacare.”178 But Dodd-Frank required formal
rulemaking to further a longstanding progressive policy goal—to limit
federal preemption of state banking and consumer-protection laws.179
Indeed, despite its reputation for permitting regulated parties to stall agency
action by forcing agencies to comply or reach settlement on industry goals,
formal rulemaking appears to be a useful tool to mitigate concerns that
regulated parties (such as financial institutions) have captured their
regulating agencies (such as the OCC).180 The key point is that as the

173 See, e.g., CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, 1 ADMIN. L. & PRAC.
§ 4:34[1] (3d ed. 2016) (arguing that formal rulemaking is “not very useful” based on FDA
use and experience).
174 See id. § 4:34[2] (citing Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S.
294, 305 (1933)).
175 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
176 See id. at 317–18.
177 See Nielson, supra note 5, at 253–92; see also supra notes 27–28 and
accompanying text (referring to the Dodd-Frank Act).
178 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
179 See Barnett, supra note 28, at 22–33.
180 Congress’s silence during the decades following the Railway Cases and its recent
invocation of formal rulemaking may suggest that Congress agrees with the Railway Cases
and requires formal rulemaking only in the limited instances in which it is beneficial. But
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debate continues, it should take formal rulemaking on its own terms and
not regard the Railway Cases as resolving the debate over its merits.
CONCLUSION
Allegheny-Ludlum, despite its great significance and troubling
provenance, has largely been forgotten. Scholars often relegate it to the
indignity of the see also citation,181 and casebook authors frequently
discuss formal rulemaking’s demise without mentioning it.182 But
Allegheny-Ludlum is more significant than its treatment suggests, even if it
should live in infamy as opposed to celebration. By recognizing the
problems with the Railway Cases, policymakers can better consider the
merits or demerits of formal rulemaking on its own terms—without the
undue influence of the Court’s two leading formal rulemaking decisions.

this is very likely reading too much into Congress’s extremely limited action. Congress was
likely silent because the Railway Cases, at least in the short term, were consistent with
congressional calls for the ICC to act with alacrity. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text. That their broader holdings did not encourage a congressional response is hardly
surprising in this context. And one use of formal rulemaking does not demonstrate that
Congress generally recognizes formal rulemaking as a useful (or problematic)
administrative device. Indeed, when investigating Congress’s use of formal rulemaking in
Dodd-Frank, I found no legislative history explaining why the provision was added or what
Congress or the drafting committees thought about formal rulemaking.
181 See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 22, at 564.
182 See, e.g., CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 177–88 (6th ed. 2010); MASHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at 507–12 (omitting
reference to Allegheny-Ludlum); JOHN M. ROGERS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 245–56 (3d
ed. 2012). But see WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 91
(4th ed. 2006) (excerpting Allegheny-Ludlum).

